Issue Brief: Prospects of West-Russia Security Dialogue on and the State of Arms Control
| Issue Brief: The Prospects of the West-Russia Security Dialogue
The conventional wisdom of the Cold War era was that, even in times of ultimate tensions, arms control served as a kind of bridge over seemingly intractable differences between two rival alliances - ostensibly immune from ideological or geopolitical rows. In the period of the post-Cold War “New World Order” illusions, with their maverick schemes of the “End of History” or the “Clash of Civilizations”, arms control seemed to be eclipsed by wider geopolitical ambitions or hopes that it was just a relic of the Cold War and did not need judicially enforceable mechanisms in the era of collaboration and trust between the West and Russia (predictably, that ended quite soon).
Abstract
The current structure of international relations resembles the standoff of the infamous Cold War times, albeit in a chaotic way. Moscow has continuously lashed out at the United States and the West for destabilizing the world order of checks and balances for its own gains. Russian political science pundits have started saying that the West has, once again, chosen the strategy of containment of Russia, which is still regarded as a foe. All this has exacerbated old Moscow grievances, first succinctly formulated by President Putin in his famous 2007 Munich speech, to the point that the West uses double standards and does not regard Russia as an equal partner. Moscow now also accuses the West of destabilizing the situation in Ukraine for its vested geopolitical interests and of imposing new dividing lines in Europe.
Russia perceives the NATO-Alliance as a major threat to its essential security interests, if not to the basic existence of Russia as a sovereign free state, and is gearing its solid defense rearmament efforts to offset any new infringements from this bloc.
Policy recommendations
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Currently, the experts can explore the principles and outlines of the envisioned future Euro-Atlantic security architecture as well as major challenges on this path and a program of step-by-step accomplishments to ease the present-day tensions in relations, the role of institutions in the Euro-Atlantic security architecture (NATO, NATO-Russia Council, OSCE, EU, CSTO, Eurasian Union, etc.) and also the way toward improving the security of areas and states in the Euro-Atlantic region that are not members of CSTO, EU, or NATO.
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We can also suggest the establishment of a new set of communication links between the Russian and the NATO military that could enhance mutual predictability and foster the promotion of better comprehension and greater trust, based on timely notifications of future moves.
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It would be especially useful in conventional arms control in Europe, which suffers from ongoing deterioration and where efforts to revive the dialogue have failed, to aim at an enhanced successor to the CFE Treaty.
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Both sides could, for example, examine what kind of positive security guarantees from Moscow, NATO member states, such as Poland and the Baltic countries, could await – in such terms as sub-regional transparency and confidence-building measures, greater openness about large-scale military exercises in border areas, and strengthening of the inspections regime in a cost-effective way.
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Moscow could, in turn, demand more guarantees against the rapid deployment of NATO forces or even an increase in no-troops-zones along the NATO-Russia borders, if real steps in demonstrating goodwill and restrictions in the military sphere are shown from its side. It could, for example, declare the non-stationing of “Iskander-M” missiles in Kaliningrad and give guarantees for the non-deployment of tactical nuclear weapons there.
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The experts could develop the outlines of the system of notifications on military aviation flights and maneuvers of naval vessels in the waters close to the borders (in the Baltic and Black Seas). Russia could also make its military activities in Crimea more transparent.
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Both NATO and Russia could practice a broader system of inviting representatives to their respective maneuvers and envision more joint peacekeeping and terrorist-fighting operations.
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The outstanding role in the process of normalization of relations and establishing lasting collaboration between Moscow and its Western partners definitely belongs to Germany, despite the current cooling of Russia-Berlin relations over Ukraine. This could eventually lead to a European security environment that could be acceptable and attractive both for Moscow and the West, while effectively precluding or quickly mitigating the outbreak of any major conflicts (such as the present one in Ukraine or the earlier “frozen” ones). It is important to concentrate on the issues of implementation of existing arms control instruments, such as New START, INF, or the OSCE’s Vienna Document – preventing the outbreak of a possible new arms race.
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P5 is the only remaining venue (despite the evident cooling of relations among the nuclear-weapon states) where the Western members can push Moscow to be more receptive to new ideas on how to save the face of nuclear weapons stakeholders, including the idea of a future multilateral dialogue on further reductions of strategic weapons in view of the 2015 NPT Review Conference. This set of proposals may be too far-reaching for the moment. However, launching such a discussion process could lead us to the stabilization of the current situation.
